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Cloud computing promises an open environment where customers can deploy IT services in
pay-as-you-go fashion while saving huge capital investment in their own IT infrastructure.
Due to the openness, various malicious service providers can exist. Such service providers
may record service requests from a customer and then collectively deduce the customer
private information. Therefore, customers need to take certain actions to protect their
privacy. Obfuscation with noise injection, that mixes noise service requests with real
customer service requests so that service providers will be confused about which
requests are real ones, is an effective approach in this regard if those request occurrence
probabilities are about the same. However, current obfuscation with noise injection uses
random noise requests. Due to the randomness it needs a large number of noise requests
to hide the real ones so that all of their occurrence probabilities are about the same,
i.e. service providers would be confused. In pay-as-you-go cloud environment, a noise
request will cost the same as a real request. Hence, with the same level of confusion,
i.e. customer privacy protection, the number of noise requests should be kept as few
as possible. Therefore in this paper we develop a novel historical probability based
noise generation strategy. Our strategy generates noise requests based on their historical
occurrence probability so that all requests including noise and real ones can reach
about the same occurrence probability, and then service providers would not be able to
distinguish in between. Our strategy can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of noise requests
over the random strategy, by more than 90% as demonstrated by simulation evaluation.
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Cloud computing is positioning itself as a new and promising platform for delivering information infrastructure and
resources as IT services [1,2]. Customers can then access these services to execute their business jobs in a pay-as-you-go
fashion while saving huge capital investment in their own IT infrastructure [3]. However, customers often have concerns
about whether their privacy can be protected when facilitating services in the cloud, since they do not have much con-
trol inside the cloud [4,5]. Correspondingly, privacy protection has become a critical issue and one of most concerning.
Without it, customers may eventually lose the conﬁdence in and desire to deploy cloud computing in practice [6,7].
Although there are many organisations, such as the banking and immigration sectors which operate under various strict
regulations and policies to protect customers’ privacy, a large number of malicious and unknown service providers can exist
in the open cloud environment. These service providers could record service requests from a customer and then collectively
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the need for the service providers’ cooperation. In this respect, obfuscation with noise injection is an effective approach
that mixes noise service requests with real customers’ service requests so that service providers would be confused about
which requests are real ones if all request occurrence probabilities are about the same. For example, the frequent occurrence
of service requests from a customer about the weather on “Gold Coast” tomorrow may help the weather service provider
to guess that the customer might travel to “Gold Coast” tomorrow. However, if we inject some noise requests like “Perth”
or “Darwin” into the “Gold Coast” request queue and make sure that their occurrence probabilities are about the same, it
would be very diﬃcult for service providers to deduce that “Gold Coast” is the real request.
Current obfuscation with noise injection uses random noise requests. Due to the randomness, we need a large number
of noise requests to dilute the real ones so that all of their occurrence probabilities are about the same, i.e. service providers
would not be able to distinguish in between. In a pay-as-you-go cloud environment, a noise request would cost the same
as its real counterpart. Therefore, with a same level of confusion, i.e. for effective customer privacy protection, the number
of noise requests should be kept as few as possible. Hence, in this paper we develop a novel historical probability based
noise generation strategy (HPNGS). Our strategy generates noise requests based on their previous occurrence probabilities,
i.e. historical probabilities, so that all requests including those noise ones and real ones can reach about the same oc-
currence probabilities. This would confuse service providers. The simulation evaluation demonstrates that our strategy can
signiﬁcantly reduce the number of noise requests by over 90% compared with the random one.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we detail related work and conduct problem analysis.
In Section 3, we present our historical probability based noise generation strategy (HPNGS). In Section 4, we perform a
simulation to demonstrate that our noise generation strategy can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of noise requests than the
random one. Finally in Section 5, we conclude our contributions and outline future work.
2. Related work and problem analysis
We start with a general overview of the literature in this area in Section 2.1. Then in Section 2.2, we focus on the
problem analysis and compare our work with others.
2.1. Related work
There are many research papers about privacy issues in cloud computing, privacy-preserving data mining, privacy infor-
mation retrieval, anonymity browsing and searching, and obfuscation with noise injection. We review them in this section.
More and more researchers are starting to produce and/or have produced remarkable research on privacy protection
related to the cloud environment. M. Smit et al. [8] describe a whole framework and methodology for managing privacy
policy of an enterprise. L. Yan et al. [9] use hierarchical identity-based cryptography to realise mutual authentication in
inter-clouds. X. Huang et al. [10] discuss privacy protection in value-added context-aware cloud. M. Hart et al. [11] develop
privacy control in the Blogs situation by tags. F. Kerschbaum [12] presents the protocol by circuit encryption on a special
business model with one service provider and many customers. K. Simoens et al. [13] present a biometric encryption
system in the privacy protection of biometric search area. P. Golle et al. [14] present the trust problem between pollsters
and respondents and use a “privacy-bond” to keep mutual trustworthy.
Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) reveals a view of privacy leakage in the minutiae [15], and the bibliography [16]
is a good introduction to this area. To protect privacy, Evﬁmievski et al. [17] use a randomisation operator to discuss the
problem of association rule mining. Many privacy preserving methods focus on a topic small dataset and a particular family
of data mining algorithms, but L. Liu et al. [18] inspect and design some approaches in the real world. Besides, K-anonymity
[19] is a promising path to cope with this searching privacy preserving situation, particularly due to large scale and uneven
distributions.
Different from PPDM, Privacy Information Retrieval (PIR) utilises another approach to keep privacy secret, which mainly
prevents database operators from knowing users’ interested records. Based on information theory, B. Chor et al. [20] have
a conclusion that, to get a perfect protection, a user has to query all entries in database when dealing with a single server
framework. A. Beimel et al. [21,22] and I. Goldberg et al. [23] apply information theories to dig deeply in PIR. Besides,
E. Kushilevitz et al. [24] and C. Cachin et al. [25] allow servers with polynomial-time computational capabilities in most
cases. S. Yinan et al. [26] use extended attribute based encryption by hierarchical relations.
Proxy or anonymity networks to protect users’ privacy have also been widely discussed [27]. The major goal is to keep
anonymity or “invisible” in a complex or “danger” network condition. Onion routing [28] and its successor TOR [29] pro-
vide a more sophisticated privacy protection scenario, making it diﬃcult for attackers to trace users via network traﬃc
analysis. O. Berthold et al. [30] propose a comprehensive framework for generating anonymous real-time Internet ac-
cess. A. Narayanan et al. [31] present a framework for analysing privacy and anonymity in social networks, and develop
a topology-based re-identiﬁcation algorithm targeting anonymous social network graphs. K. Hawkey et al. [32] research
identity anonymity to protect privacy in Web 2.0.
Obfuscation with noise injection is another widely adopted method for protecting information privacy. It facilitates in-
formation theories to discover the characters of information [33]. S. Ye et al. [34] describe noise injection in search privacy
protection by formulating noise injection as a mutual information minimisation problem. U. Hengartner et al. [35] design
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encoding policies as digital certiﬁcates and present an algorithm for the discovery of distributed certiﬁcates in access control
to location privacy. K. Fukushima et al. [36] discuss obfuscation mechanism in mobile condition. G. Zhang et al. [37] discuss
a trust mechanism in noise obfuscation scenarios in the cloud.
2.2. Problem analysis
As analysed in Section 1, various malicious service providers can exist in cloud computing environment. They may record
customer’s service requests and collectively deduce customer private information. Therefore, customers need to take certain
actions to protect their privacy without the need of cooperation from service providers. This is the scenario that we are
addressing in this paper.
Existing research on privacy protection in cloud computing mainly focuses on service provider side and sometimes
needs cooperation between customer side and service provider side such as encryption and decryption. Hence, they cannot
be directly applied to the scenario stated above.
PPDM is not a good choice to address the scenario either because it is out of customers’ control, hence not suitable for
customer privacy protection. PIR is mainly working at service provider side, hence has the similar problem. Anonymity or
proxy networks need service provider’s cooperation to enable such access. Besides, their IP source can be traced in the end
especially for normal common customers.
Obfuscation with noise injection seems naturally effective in protecting customer privacy because it injects noise service
requests to confuse service providers and does not need cooperation from service providers. However, current obfuscation
with noise injection generates noise requests randomly and due to the randomness, we need a large number of noise
requests to mix with the real ones so that all of their occurrence probabilities are about the same, i.e. service providers
would not be able to distinguish in between. As stated in Section 1, in a pay-as-you-go cloud environment, a noise request
will cost the same as a real request. Therefore, with the same level of confusion, i.e. for effective customer privacy protection,
the number of noise requests should be kept as few as possible. For this purpose, we develop a novel historical probability
based noise generation strategy denoted as HPNGS that can signiﬁcantly reduce the number of noise requests. We discuss
HPNGS in detail in the following section.
3. Historical probability based noise generation strategy
We ﬁrst discuss noise injection in Section 3.1. Then in Section 3.2, we investigate historical probability based noise
generation. Finally in Section 3.3, we present our HPNGS.
3.1. Noise Injection
3.1.1. Basic noise injection model
Based on [34], we describe the basic noise injection model in Fig. 1.
Denotations in Fig. 1 are listed as follows:
QU : a queue of customer’s real service requests which are to be protected.
QN : a queue of noise service requests which are to be injected into QU .
Q S : a queue of ﬁnal service requests, which composes of QU and QN .
Q : a common set of values of QU , Q S and QN . And Q = {q1,q2, . . . ,qi, . . . ,qn}. As we can see, a noise service request
happens to be the same as a real one in Q S for service providers.
ε: probability for injecting QN into QU , and ε ∈ [0,1]. We call it noise injection intensity.
The overall working process of the model is to inject QN into QU based on ε so that we can get Q S . QU is generated by
the customer. QN is generated randomly independent of QU . ε plays a role like a switch. The probability for QN to become
Q S is ε while that for QU to become Q S is 1− ε.
3.1.2. Improved noise injection model
In the basic model, noise requests are generated randomly. As stated in Section 1 and Section 2.2, to protect the customer
privacy we need to make the occurrence probabilities of all noise and real service requests about the same. To achieve this,
random noise generation would need a large number of noise service requests because the same noise request may occur
frequently. It then needs more injections of other noise service requests to balance the probability difference. Our idea
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is to use historical occurrence probabilities of various service requests. Simply speaking, those noise requests with higher
historical occurrence probabilities are used less and vice versa. By this means, we can effectively dilute the occurrence
of noise requests in a balanced fashion so that we can achieve about the same occurrence probabilities with fewer noise
requests. As such, we improve the basic noise injection model with the one described in Fig. 2.
The dash line in Fig. 2 means that we utilise historical occurrence probabilities of service requests to generate new noise
service requests.
The overall working process of the model is also to inject QN into QU based on ε so that we can get Q S . The difference
to the basic model is that we need to record historical probabilities of all service requests and then apply them to the noise
generation. The model can be described as follows. Suppose qi is a value of Q and P (QU = qi), P (QN = qi) and P (Q S = qi)
are probabilities of qi in QU , QN and Q S respectively. P (Q = qi) is the probability of qi in past Q S . Hence, qi has appeared
in Q S with a probability of P (Q = qi). It appears in QN with a probability of P (QN = qi). To protect customer privacy,
we need to achieve that ∀i, all P (Q S = qi) are about the same. Therefore, if P (Q = qi) has a high value, then qi will not
be taken as noise this time so that P (QN = qi) will have a smaller value, and vice versa. This is the general process of
generating noise requests based on historical probabilities of service requests. The details are presented in the next section.
3.2. Historical probability based noise generation
To achieve the outcome that if P (Q = qi) has a high value and hence qi will not be taken as noise, we have designed
the following strategy to generate our noise based on historical probabilities. Firstly, we should record all noise generation
probabilities as historical probabilities, and then discuss the noise injection intensity ε.
3.2.1. Noise generation probabilities
To achieve noise generation probabilities P (QN = qi), ∀i, we should record all P (Q = qi), ∀i in advance. In all of
the probabilities of P (Q = qi), the highest one is M = MAX{P (Q = qi), ∀i}. It is an accumulative record from previous
P (Q = qi). These are historical probabilities. Accordingly, we get the noise generation probabilities by Eq. (1) below:
P (QN = qi) = M − P (Q = qi)∑
j{M − P (Q = q j)}
, ∀i. (1)
Eq. (1) is based on the following idea: if P (Q = qi) has a high value, then the numerator must have a low value, and
vice versa. P (Q = qi) is a historical probability and is within the range of [0,1]. P (QN = qi), ∀i are also within the range
of [0,1]. It is the key of the whole strategy. The denominator is to ensure Eq. (2) below:
∑
i
P (QN = qi) = 1. (2)
Because of
∑
j[M − P (Q = q j)] = n × M − 1 = 1, the denominator is necessary to ensure that Eq. (2) is kept.
The generation probability of random noise is P (QN = qi) = 1n , ∀i. With our strategy, we have P (QN = qi) =
M−P (Q =qi )
n×M−1 , ∀i. This is an improvement that saves the number of noise requests. We will further demonstrate this in Sec-
tion 4 by comparison simulation.
3.2.2. Noise injection intensity
Eq. (1) can express noise generation probabilities. According to the improved noise injection model in Section 3.1.2, ε is a
necessary parameter for effective noise injection. It stands for the probability of all noises in the ﬁnal service request queue.
As indicated earlier, it is called noise injection intensity.
To reach the privacy protection discussed in Section 2.2, we need Eq. (3) below:
P (Q S = qi) = 1
n
, ∀i. (3)
We distinguish P (Q = qi) and P (Q S = qi). The former is a historical probability from run-time historical data about Q S ;
the latter is a future probability with new QN about Q S .
From the improved noise injection model described in Section 3.1.2, we can get the probabilities of Q S which comprise
of QU and QN based on Eq. (4) below:
P (Q S = qi) = (1− ε)P (QU = qi) + εP (QN = qi). (4)
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Historical probability based noise generation strategy.
Input: QU is a queue of real service requests.
Output: Q S is the queue of output service requests mixed with noise requests.
Step 1: collect data items and initiate all historical
probabilities P (Q = qi) from counters
Initiate n+ 1 counters C[n + 1] to record numbers of each kind of service request and
the sum.
Record all real service-requests from previous Q S and update corresponding counter
C[i] + + and the sum C[n + 1] + +.
Compute historical probabilities P (Q = qi) = C[i]C[n+1] .
Step 2: compute every noise generation probability
P (QN = qi)
Generate every probability for noise from Eq. (1):
P (QN = qi) = M − P (Q = qi)∑
j{M − P (Q = q j)}
, ∀i.
Step 3: compute noise injection intensity ε and noise
QN
Compute ε = Max{ε(i)} by
ε(i) =
1
n − P (QU = qi)
M−P (Q =qi )
n×M−1 − P (QU = qi)
, ∀i.
By now we get QN [P (QN = qi), ε].
Step 4: noise injection Generate a noise N from the ﬁnal noise: QN [P (QN = qi), ε].
Inject N into QU with the probability of ε to get Q S .
Update P (Q = qi), ∀i with counters C[i] and C[n + 1].
Go to Step 2.
Combining Eqs. (3) and (4), we get Eq. (5) below to obtain noise injection intensity ε,
ε(i) =
1
n − P (QU = qi)
M−P (Q =qi)
n×M−1 − P (QU = qi)
, ∀i. (5)
The ﬁnal ε is the maximum one and is derived by Eq. (6) below:
ε = Max{ε(i)}. (6)
Eqs. (1) and (6) ensure that the whole strategy reaches its privacy protection goal as stated by Eq. (3).
During operation, P (Q = qi) and M are updated in the process of noise injection. With recorded noise injections, Eq. (5)
is kept for all cases. Then, we can get ε via Eq. (6) which is within the range of [0,1]. But with random noise generation, we
need P (QN = qi) = 1n , ∀i to retain Eq. (3). Therefore, with Eq. (4), we have ε = 1. This is not reasonable because it means
that we never send out any real service requests.
3.3. Historical probability based noise generation strategy
In this section, we introduce the historical probability based noise generation strategy – HPNGS based on Section 3.2.
During the working process of Algorithm 1, P (Q = qi), ∀i, P (QN = qi), ∀i and ε are all changing with noise injections.
We can ﬁnd that P (Q = qi), ∀i will become more and more even with noise injections, which is our privacy protection
objective. P (QN = qi), ∀i will also become more and more even with the changing P (Q = qi). ε will become lower and
lower. This means that fewer noise requests will be used while achieving the same privacy protection outcome.
4. Comparison and simulation
As analysed in Section 2.2, a random noise generation strategy needs a large number of noise requests to mix with real
ones for customer privacy protection so that all of their occurrence probabilities are about the same, i.e. service providers
would be confused, i.e. not being able to distinguish the noise ones from their real counterparts. As stated in Section 1,
in a pay-as-you-go cloud environment, a noise request will cost the same as a real one. Therefore, with the same level of
confusion, i.e. for effective customer privacy protection, the number of noise requests should be kept as few as possible. As
presented in Section 3, our strategy of HPNGS focuses on the noise generation process. It generates noise requests based
on their historical probabilities. Those noise requests which have higher probabilities will be used less. As such, we can
use fewer noise requests to reach the privacy protection situation where all service requests will appear in about the same
probabilities.
We now perform an experimental simulation in our cloud computing simulation environment called SwinCloud [38]. Our
aim is to simulate the random noise generation strategy and our HPNGS to demonstrate that our HPNGS can signiﬁcantly
reduce the number of noise requests.
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In Section 4.1, we describe the simulation environment. We then detail the simulation process in Section 4.2. In Sec-
tion 4.3, we depict and analyse the simulation results to demonstrate the signiﬁcant reduction of our HPNGS on the number
of noise requests over the random noise generation strategy.
4.1. Simulation environment
SwinCloud is a cloud computing simulation environment. It is built on the computing facilities at Swinburne University
of Technology [38]. In general, these functions of VMWare can offer uniﬁed computing and storage resources. Utilising the
uniﬁed resources, we set up data centres that can host applications. In the data centres, Hadoop, which can facilitate the
Map-Reduce computing paradigm and distributed data management, is installed. The architecture of SwinCloud is depicted
in Fig. 3.
4.2. Simulation process
In SwinCloud, we set two nodes to represent customer and service provider respectively. The customer node ﬁrstly
generates a real service request queue from a set of requests. Then it generates a noise service request queue to inject
into the real queue; they form a single request set. The service provider node receives the ﬁnal service request queue and
analyses the occurrence probabilities of those requests.
To demonstrate the advantage of our HPNGS strategy, we set up the simulation process to compare it with existing
random noise generation strategy. In the process, we compare noise injection intensity ε of two strategies which reﬂect the
number of injected noise requests.
We set a function Var(Strategy, ε) to denote the variance of probabilities of all ﬁnal service requests including real ones
and noise ones. To confuse the service provider for customer privacy protection, all probabilities should be about the same.
That is to say, when Var(Strategy, ε) approaches 0, we are approaching the situation where customer privacy is protected.
As such, the process needs to record and compare the changing noise injection intensities of both strategies.
4.3. Simulation results and analysis
Based on simulation process described in Section 4.2, we can derive Var(HPNGS, ε) and Var(Random, ε). They are de-
picted in Fig. 4. They change by ε.
In Fig. 4, the horizontal coordinate is Var. As Var approaches 0, the probabilities of all service requests are becoming
about the same, i.e. privacy protection situation. The vertical coordinate is the noise injection intensity ε. When ε is smaller,
there are fewer noise requests.
From Fig. 4, we can see the following: when Var approaches 0, the ε of our HPNGS is around 0.52038 while the ε of
random noise generation strategy is around 0.9312. This means that with our strategy, we can achieve a 91.85% reduction
in the number of noise requests over the random one. Therefore, we can say that our strategy can signiﬁcantly reduce the
number of noise requests when compared with the random counterpart.
5. Conclusions and future work
In an open cloud computing environment, various malicious service providers can exist. Such service providers may
record service requests from a customer and then collectively deduce the customer private information. Therefore, customers
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need to protect their privacy. Obfuscation with noise injection, which mixes noise service requests with real customer
service requests so that service providers will be confused about which requests are real ones, is an effective approach
in this regard if their occurrence probabilities are about the same. However, current obfuscation with noise injection uses
random noise requests. Due to the randomness, it needs a large number of noise requests to dilute the real ones to ensure
that all of their occurrence probabilities are about the same. In a pay-as-you-go cloud environment, a noise request would
cost the same as a real request. Hence, with the same level of confusion, i.e. for effective customer privacy protection, the
number of noise requests should be kept as few as possible. In this paper, we have developed a novel historical probability
based noise generation strategy named HPNGS. HPNGS generates noise requests based on their historical probability. Those
noise requests with higher historical probability will be used less. The simulation has demonstrated that our HPNGS can
signiﬁcantly reduce the number of noise requests over its random counterpart by over 90%.
Based on this research, we plan to further investigate privacy protection issues in the situation where multiple service
providers collaborate with each other to deduce customer privacy.
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